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Abstract:The appropriateness of financial liberalisation in Africa - at least over the short-term - is in doubt. It
has been suggested that the credit risks faced by financial institutions will be detrimental to the supply of
credit. The contribution of this paper is to point out that financial liberalisation creates a significant interest
rate risk. It is argued that this interest rate risk will bias African banks’ activities towards brokerage rather
than maturity-transformation functions.  Furthermore, it is stressed that the management of interest rate risk is
in itself likely to lead to a reduction in the supply of credit. In this regard the usefulness of capital adequacy as
defined by the Basle Committee is investigated.2
1. Introduction
An increasing number of African countries are undertaking trade liberalisation measures as
part of structural adjustment programmes, often with the assistance of the IMF and World
Bank. In most cases these programmes are accompanied by financial liberalisation  because
"structural adjustment has been hampered in several countries, because resources have
continued to flow to unprofitable uses rather than to the activities made profitable by
devaluations and trade reforms" (Long, 1991:162).
Recently it has argued that financial liberalisation might adversely affect structural
adjustment in Africa (Collier,1993; Adam & Ncube,1994; Nissanke, 1991a and Adam, 1995).
It is emphasised that banks in Africa face more substantial credit risks during structural
adjustment because many of their major borrowers have to face more competitive and riskier
circumstances than before.
A less emphasised aspect of financial liberalisation is the fact that it also results in
significant interest rate risks for banks. This could strain bank management and thus jeopardise
structural adjustment since,
" The experience of many countries that have undertaken this process of interest rate liberalization shows that
the transition process from rigid interest rates to a system of more flexible and market-determined rates can be
traumatic if not properly managed"
(Leite and Sundararajan, 1991:148).) Partly this trauma will be due to bank insolvency caused
by mismanagement (De Juan, 1991:45).
The purpose of this paper is to determine the implications of interest rate risk
management by commercial banks in the African context. African financial liberalisations are
taking place against the backdrop of a general period of financial fragility, with bank failures
and bank restructuring occuring in major international financial centres the United Kingdom,
United States, Norway, Sweden, Singapore and Japan (see Corbo & Hernandez, 1993:95). To
avoid financial distress and the failure of structural adjustment programmes, it is important
that policymakers in Africa take note of the pitfalls that interest rate movements might have on
bank profitability, how banks should manage these risks, and what the implications of their
behaviour will be for trade liberalisation and export expansion programmes.
As background, the next section briefly describes trade and financial liberalisation in
Africa. Lessons from the Southern Cone - as far as interest rate risks are concerned - are3
drawn out in section 3. Section 4 considers the interest rate experiences of five African
countries with financial liberalisation, namely The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and
Zimbabwe. In section 5 methods to minimise interest rates in a deregulated environment is
explored. Section 6 contains a summary and conclusions.
2. Trade and Financial Liberalisation in Africa
After independence most African countries chose import-substitution industrialisation, with
heavy state involvement, as an economic growth strategy. This required quota restrictions and
tariffs on imports and fixed (overvalued) exchange rates. The excess demand for foreign
exchange generated by this combination of policies led to foreign exchange being allocated by
the government, and resulted in substantial rents to importing firms with access to foreign
exchange. It also resulted in parallel (and often illegal) markets for foreign exchange. Because
an overvalued exchange rate implicitly taxes exports,  it also led to smuggling and growing
external deficits (Bevan et al, 1990). Higher state expenditure, accompanied by a shrinking tax
base resulted in growing budget deficits. Initially many governments imposed further controls
on imports to maintain external balance, kept interest rates at artificially low levels and
directed domestic lending. However, with foreign exchange reserves becoming depeleted,
many governments were subsequently forced into structural adjustment programmes at the
end of the 1970s (Lall, 1987). These programmes consisted of trade liberalisation measures
coupled with controls on credit to the government. The aim of these were to move resources
towards the production of tradables, and therefore required devaluation and scrapping of
import quotas to generate expenditure reducing and expenditure-switching effects (Cooper,
1991).
Much has been written on the proper timing, sequencing and speed of  trade
liberalisation measures (e.g. Edwards, 1990; Falvi & Kim, 1992). The current (fragile)
consensus is reflected in the almost standardised approach followed by the IMF and World
Bank. The most often described examples in Africa are those of Ghana and perhaps Kenya,
and in more recent years Zimbabwe, The Gambia and Ethiopia. Since financial markets in
African countries are generally considered to have been "repressed", at some time or another
in the past, financial  liberalisation/deregulation is often  prescribed to accompany trade
liberalisation (Gupta, 1994; Nissanke, 1991).4
Villanueva (1988 : 67) lists some of the African countries implementing financial
liberalisation according to its main objective.  In Algeria, Egypt, Botswana and Mauritius the
objective of financial reform is to improve the monetary (indirect) control system. In Zaïre and
Kenya the objective is to improve the mobilisation and allocation of domestic resources by
developing money markets and bank regulation and legislation. In Mauritania, Senegal,
Burundi, the Gambia and Sierra Leone the objective is to improve the level and structure of
interest rates.
Collier (1993:2) lists African financial liberalisations according to the most conspicious
measures undertaken. For instance, a deregulation of interest rates has taken place in Angola,
Burundi, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Bank restructuring is taking
place in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda. Some
bank privatisation has taken place in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Senegal,
while bank liquidation and new bank entries have occurred in Benin, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal,
Nigeria, Uganda, Ethiopia and Zambia. Adam (1995) contains a succinct account of the
financial liberalisation difficulties that occurred in Zambia.
3. Lessons from the Southern Cone
The justification for financial liberalisation is the financial repression hypothesis, which
maintains that interest rate ceilings and state intervention in credit allocation is detrimental to
the availability and quality of savings and investment (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973;  Fry,
1982). This hypothesis underwent a re-assessment following the experiences of the Southern
Cone countries, Argentina (1977-80), Chile (1975-81) and Uruguay (1977-82)1 . For
instance, Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989:205) are convinced that the  financial repression
paradigm is "a kernel of truth and a vast exaggeration". The  consensus seems to be that
financial reform in itself, as envisaged in the financial repression paradigm is desirable, but
where it has failed, it was either due to the design and sequencing of the reform measures
(McKinnon, 1988), or caused by adverse factors such as external shocks and macroeconomic
policies during the process (Corbo et al, 1986).
                                               
1  The financial and trade liberalisation episodes in the Southern Cone have been studied extensively
elsewhere, see for e.g. Corbo et al (1986), Corbo & de Melo (1987), Urrutia (1988) and Faruqi (1993).5
Given the focus of this paper on the management of interest rate risk the relevant question is :
what lessons can be derived from the Southern Cone experience ? In this regard, financial
liberalisation2  in the Southern Cone resulted in exceptionally high levels of real interest rates,
and in diverging spreads between deposit and loan rates. It will be argued below that these
were symptomatic of inappropriate bank management  and eventually affected trade reforms
adversely.
(i) High Levels of Real Interest Rates
In all three countries real interest rates increased to levels well above LIBOR plus the rate of
expected devaluation. In Chile the average real lending rate was 41 percent per annum
between 1975 and 1981, in Argentina 17 percent per annum between 1977 and 1980, while in
Uruguay the lending rate averaged 15 percent per annum between 1977 and 1982. Although
these higher interest rates were partly caused by overvalued exchange rates which created
expectations of devaluation and initially strict monetary policies, a more fundamental cause
was weak supervision which gave rise to moral hazard and  adverse selection problems
amongst banks and their clients.
In Latin American, as recently with the Savings-and Loan crises in the United States,
moral hazard arose due to implicit or explicit deposit insurance which increased the incentives
for risk-taking (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). Normally, under circumstances of adequate bank
supervision, banks will rather ration credit than take on additional borrowers if interest rates
increase (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Under inadequate supervision, adverse selection of
borrowers may occur because the probability of repayment of a loan is negatively related to
the interest rate charged by the bank. If banks can be assumed to be maximising expected
profits, which will depend on the interest rate as well as the probability of repayment, the
bank's expected profit could peak at  a non-market clearing interest rate.
                                               
2  The measures implemented by Southern Cone countries were those typically recommended by economists
supporting the financial repression hypothesis, such as the removal of interest rate ceiling and credit controls.
In the Southern Cone’s case, these steps were implemented abruptly, and were accompanied by a relaxation of
banking supervision.6
If banks engage in risky activities and suffer losses as a result, a principal-agent
problem can occur, as indeed happened in the Southern Cone. In this regard, banks that
suffered losses to their  capital bases, were tempted to invest in riskier projects in an attempt
to quickly recover these losses. To attract deposits, especially when facing increased
competition in the wake of financial liberalisation, many banks increased deposit rates to very
high levels, and often interest was paid by attracting  new deposits, i.e. banks became engaged
in Ponzi-schemes. As such, high deposit rates following a  financial liberalisation episode
might be an indication that  banks  are in need of liquidity. In the Southern Cone, less
supervision had another adverse selection problem, namely that less risk averse firms entered
the banking market, especially through large conglomorates obtaining majority  shareholding
in commercial banks (Tybout, 1985). These banks were then encouraged to make high risk
loans to its holding firm or its subsidiaries, and where loans could not be repaid, it was rolled-
over (a process known as "evergreening", since it does not appear on the banks books as a
nonperforming loan). The Southern Cone experience in this regard suggests a  deficiency in
Stiglitz and Weiss' (1983) modelling of the dynamic aspects of credit rationing. They
investigated the effect of banks threatening risky clients with future credit denial in case of
default, but omitted to take into account that such threats are time inconsistent, since if the
bank carries out its threat in the future it might forego potential future profits from lending.
Related to the adverse selection problem for banks, distress borrowing by firms which
are negatively affected by trade reform measures may create a false demand for credit
(Harberger, 1985). Especially when the trade reform measures are considered to be incredible,
will there  exist an incentive for inefficient firms to borrow to cover what they perceive as
temporary losses. In this respect, high interest rates may be a symptom of distress borrowing if
it is accompanied by high and variable inflation, an overvalued exchange rate and large and
unsustainable government deficits. All of these factors were present in the Southern Cone
(Hanson & Rocha, 1986). A false demand for credit, as well as a large share of nonperforming
loans in a banking system implies an empirical testable proposition, namely that the interest
rate elasticity of credit demand will decrease as false demands and nonperforming loans
increase. Estimation of such credit demand functions falls outside the scope of the present
paper.7
In Bolivia in 1985-86,  high real interest rates were observed after financial
liberalisation. These were largely caused by high banking operating costs. For instance,
following a fall in inflation as a result of successful stabilisation, most banks found themselves
over-staffed and burdened with high operating costs, a legacy of a high-inflation environment.
Many banks as a consequence reduced their personnel and closed branches, but still needed to
impose high lending rates in order to meet the high unit operating costs (Moretti, 1992:23).
(ii) Spreads between Deposit and Loan Rates
A second visible effect of financial liberalisation on bank management in the Southern Cone
was that spreads between borrowing and loan rates increased dramatically, averaging about 13
percent in the three countries during the liberalisation periods (Ramos, 1988:56). In the
Southern Cone, and also later in Bolivia, this was mainly caused by high operating, transaction
and default costs. High operating and transactions costs were incurred because banks
preferred that the majority of their assets had short-term maturities. This was due to the fact
that the majority of their deposits were of a short duration (less than 30 days). In essence,
banks in the Southern Cone became brokerage firms rather than asset transformation firms,
and thus no financial deepening in the normal sense of the word took place. For long-term
projects, short-term loans were rolled over frequently, which increased transaction costs. High
default costs were due to a large and increasing proportion of non-performing loans in total
assets. In an attempt to remain solvent, banks increased the wedge between loan and deposit
rates.
It was noted in a previous section that financial liberalisation in the Southern Cone
took place abrupty, without macroeconomic stability having been attained beforehand. From a
depositor's  point of view, high inflation associated with macroeconomic instability will drive a
wedge between (real) deposit and loan rates.  To see this, consider first the case of no
inflation. If a bank is required to keep cash reserves, the wedge between deposit and loan rates
(w) is equal to l- l(1-r), where l = the loan rate and r = the reserve requirement. If inflation
equal to p is now generated, the wedge would increase to  l - l(l-r) - p, implying that the
inflation tax on reserves is being passed on to depositors. This would decrease the supply of
deposits, and will therefore not be conducive for financial deepening. It can also be observed8
that high inflation creates an incentive for governments to increase banks' cash reserve ratio's,
which will have the effect of further increasing the wedge between loan and deposit rates and
discouraging deposits further (Fry, 1985).
(iii) Outcomes
In Argentina and Chile, despite the inflow of funds into banking deposits and an inflow of
foreign capital due to the high interest rates, the quantity and quality of investment and saving
did not improve. To a large degree this was due to a repressed demand for consumer durables.
It is interesting to note that in Chile asset values (as measured by prices on the stock
exchange) increased substantially following the increase in interest rates. This gave added
stimulus to the demand for consumer goods. The fact that a stock exchange boom was
observed in Chile following interest rate deregulation is, however, unexpected, since at higher
interest rates future income streams are discounted at greater percentages and the present
value of stock prices should thus fall once interest rates increase. More specifically, if the
expectations theory of the interest rate is valid, then stock prices should fall when the financial
liberalisation measures are announced. However, the extent of the stock exchange price
increase was such that a speculative bubble3  developed in Chile between 1979Q3 and
1980Q4. A possible explanation for this is that economic agents expected the high interest
rates to be transitory. Applying the reasoning underlying the expectations theory of the interest
rate, this suggests an inverse yield curve. In this sense the Chilean experience is one where
agents initially thought that the trade and financial reform would lead to an increase in
investment and future growth, and their preliminary expectations were reflected in stock
prices.  After a period however, as the inconsistencies in the program became clear,
expectations of future growth were revised downwards, external circumstances changed
adversely and the bubble burst during the early 1980s. The consequences for the banking
systems in the Southern Cone countries are described by Ramos (1988:73) who concludes that
"the three experiences came close with their financial systems in a shambles" (Ramos,
1988:73). In all three countries the government had to intervene in bankrupted banks, and in
                                               
3  A speculative bubble can be defined as a situation in which  share prices increase faster than the interest rate
for a number of periods, after which the change in share prices is smaller than the change in interest rates for a
number of periods.9
Chile for instance, banks were all re-nationalised. The economy-wide effects of the failed
liberalisation attempts were reflected in significant declines in real GDP per capita : in
Argentina real GDP per capita growth between 1981-84 was -11.8 %, in Chile -10.5 % and in
Uruguay, -16.2 %.
To derive the relevant aspects for African economies from the Southern Cone's
experience, is it necessary to note differences in macroeconomic circumstances and the nature
of existing financial systems in Africa. With respect to the former, at the time of the Southern
Cone's liberalisations, domestic liquidity levels were high, and external interest rates were at
historical lows. Accordingly, the Southern Cone countries in effect adopted "debt-led" growth
strategies, by borrowing heavily abroad (Bianchi, 1988:23). Abundant use was made of
financial resources offered by private international banks. These favourable external
circumstances allowed inappropriately risky bank management to continue unabated until the
early 1980s, when the international environment changed adversely. The consequent  decline
in the Southern Cone's terms of trade, the increase in real international interest rates and the
sharp decline in the net inflow of capital was among the factors that finally triggered a massive
collapse in the financial systems of these countries. As far as the common elements between
the Southern Cone and Africa are concerned, one of the most striking is the preference of
banks to grant short-term loans (Nissanke, 1991a).  A reason for this in Africa is due to
information deficiencies and lack of reputation in African financial markets, which cause banks
to prefer short-term loans in order to keep borrowers within arms' reach (Collier, 1993).
As in the Southern Cone, trade and financial liberalisation were accompanied by
banking crises and bank restructuring in Africa. This was probably the most severe in Benin,
where all the banks were forced to close their doors. In Kenya, the relative ease of entry into
the banking sector during 1982-86 had resulted in a rapid growth in the number of financial
institutions, a number of which suffered difficulties in recent years. In Ghana, the net worth of
the banking system was negative by the second half of 1988, mainly due to foreign exchange
losses and a high proportion of nonperforming loans (World Bank, 1990:53).
 A common feature of the African episodes of financial distress is the authorities' late
and belated recognition of the distress. Popiel (1994:4) point to the fact that "In many cases,10
bank supervisors were either technically unable or politically reluctant to take stock of the true
extent of the losses of distressed banks".  This is somewhat different from the Southern Cone
case where supervision and regulations were in fact intentionally relaxed.  Another common
feature of African episodes of financial distress is that bank restructuring and rehabilitation
took a relatively long time to accomplish. For instance in Ghana, the restructuring took eight
years (Harvey, 1993:28).
In addition to differences in the macroeconomic environment, the relevance of the
Southern Cone experience should also be judged in light of the nature and structure of banking
in Africa. A first characteristic of financial systems in Africa is that the level of domestic saving
in the continent as a whole is well below that of all other developing regions (Popiel, 1994:1).
It is thus imperative that financial intermediation in African economies be improved, although
the opposite took place during the 1980s. According to Popiel (1994:3) this was due to
financial repression in the form of direct government intervention in setting interest rates and
granting credit that led to (i) the lack of appropriate legal, regulatory and prudential
frameworks; (ii) widespread insolvency and illiquidity of firms;  (iii) a lack of adequate
financial and accounting information and (iv) a lack of sufficient human skills and technology.
Also, the widespread occurrence of informal financial markets may have hindered financial
deepening  (Chhibber & Shafik, 1991).
Formal financial systems in Africa are dominated by commercial banks. With some
exceptions, commercial banks usually own approximately 85 to 95 percent of the total assets
of the financial system. These commercial banks are often highly concentrated in their
ownership structure : for instance in Ghana one commercial bank accounts for more than 50
percent of the total assets of the financial system.
The dominance of commercial banks in Sub-Saharan Africa's financial systems can be
explained by Leland and Pyle's (1977) theory on the existence of banks. They view financial
markets as being characterised by imperfect information, so that banks become "insiders" into
firms' investment decisions. In this way, banks' willingness to lend to a firm gives investors
(depositors) information about the quality of the firm. Thus, by granting loans to the firm,
banks demonstrate their commitment to the portfolio and signal the value of the underlying11
assets. This accords with Diamond's (1991) result that relatively new borrowers without well-
established reputations have the most to gain from bank monitoring, and hence choose bank
loans instead of equity to finance investment.
The two basic functions that banks perform as financial intermediaries is that of
brokerage and maturity-transformation (Niehans, 1978). If a bank precisely matches the
maturity of its deposits and loans, it functions in essence as a broker. The broker's usefulness
is simply to reduce the search costs of joining borrowers and lenders. If a bank modifies the
attributes of financial claims, such as their duration, it is said to be engaged in maturity
tranformation.  Maturity  transformation may facilitate liquidity creation, especially on the
long-term side of the market. In addition, when a bank engages in maturity transformation,
there will exist enhanced incentives for screening and monitoring (Bhattacharya & Thakor,
1993 :12).
The balance sheets of banks in Africa are characterised by a dominance of short-term
lending and short-term deposits. Long-term markets for funds are virtually absent in most
cases. This implies that if financial liberalisation is to succeed in developing financial markets
and in facilitating trade liberalisation and export expansion,  incentives have to be created  for
banks to expand their activities from being brokerage firms to being maturity transformers.
Similar to the Southern Cone's experience, banking in Africa is generally characterised
by high intermediation costs. However, in Africa , it is mainly due to many banks being under
government control  with the consequence of  severe overstaffing. In some African countries,
most notably Ethiopia and Tanzania, the banking sector is wholly state-owned, and the largest
proportion of outstanding loans is held by the government. In such cases, interest rate
deregulation will for obvious budgetary reasons not be feasible.
The above discussion has highlighted that financial liberalisation should be an undertaking
African countries should consider with caution. Specifically, the problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection can be expected a priori to occur, given the weaknesses in the structure of
banking in Africa. Tell-tale signs of these might be high levels of real interest rates,
divergences between deposit and loan rates, and finally, in light of the preference for banks to12
play only a brokerage role in Africa, the yield curve itself might change slope and might
become inverted. The next section analyses these issues empirically.
4. African Experiences with Financial Liberalisation
With reference to the level of interest rates, the spread between deposit and loan rates and the term
structure of interest rates, five African economies are analysed in this section, namely The Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. This is a small sample but nevertheless include the
countries with the most advanced financial systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kenya and Zimbabwe),
as well as the countries where structural adjustment has been an ongoing process for more than a
decade (Kenya and Ghana).
(i) The Gambia
In August 1985 The Gambia adopted an Economic Reform Programme (ERP) in collaboration
with the IMF and World Bank. To facilitate the adoption of a floating exchange rate system,
interest rates were deregulated. Previously maximum limits were imposed on the interest rates
charged and paid by commercial banks. The deregulation of interest rates took place abruptly.
Figure 1 below shows the evolution of commercial bank loan and deposit rates in The Gambia,
from 1983 to 1993.13
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It can be seen from Figure 1 that for a period following financial liberalisation, 1985:1 to
1985:2 that average deposit rates exceeded average loan rates for a short period. This was casued
be a sudden switches in the term structure of interest rates- evident in the sharp fall in loan rates.
Weber (1966) and Stigum (1976) have pointed out that interest rates will move sluggishly for
banks with long-lived assets. The  consequence is that in oligopolistic banking systems, as in Africa,
banks will be forced to adjust deposit rates more slowly than market forces would dictate. Evidence
of this sluggish adjustment in the case of the Gambia can be seen from Figure 1 in that deposit rates
only started increasing substantially from 1986 onwards, after loan rates jumped to a higher level.
Thus, to generalise, given the structure of banking in Africa, switches in the term structure of
interest rates will be a disincentive for banks to lend out long. Banks thus revert to fulfilling a pure
brokerage function to the detriment of maturity-transformation4 .
                                               
4   On the other hand, in an economy where financial liberalisation has actually succeeded in fostering maturity
transformation by banks, sluggish adjustment due to changes in interest rate regulation will be likely. Since indirect
monetary policy measures will then have a slower impact on the economy, policy makers could become frustrated and
be tempted to revert to direct controls over interest rates and credit - see the discussion of Nigeria below.14
(ii) Ghana
Ghana introduced a structural adjustment and stabilization programme in April 1983. The essential
outline of this programme is a typical example of the IMF and World Bank assisted programmes in
Africa, and is described in Kapur et al (1991). In contrast to The Gambia, interest rate deregulation
proceeded gradually. In October 1983 all interest rates were raised by between 3 and 5 percent.
The spread between key deposit and lending rates was narrowed while interest rates for priority
sectors were adjusted upwards. In September 1987 interest rates were finally liberalised by
abolishing maximum lending and minimum deposit rates. The evolution of interest rates in Ghana
between 1983 and 1993 is shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2 indicates that shortly after the interest rate liberalisation, the gap between average
deposit and lending rates initially contracted, before widening again. This contraction might be due
to the same sluggishness of response as was described in the case of The Gambia. However, the
degree of sluggishness did not result in deposit rates exceeding lending rates, as was the case in The
Gambia. Compared to the pre-liberalisation period, the average gap between lending and deposit
rates increased significantly.15
The balance sheets of Ghana’s commercial banks (who owns 70 percent of the assets of the
banking sector) have been analysed by Nissanke's (1991a : 142-3). He points out that  (i)
commercial banks are holding excess liquidity above the level required by the Central Bank and that
(ii) their loan portfolios are concentrated on the short end of the market.  The reason for these
preferences appear to be the absence of viable projects to which to lend, as well as the nonexistence
of an effective interbank market. With excess liquidity and limited lending opportunities there is
little incentive for banks to attract deposits and engage in maturity transformation. Currently in
Ethiopia for example, the commercial banks refuse deposits above a certain amount. When interest
rates are simultaneously expected to fall, banks will have even less incentive to attract longer-term
deposits, and this will be reflected in a negative spread (yield curve) between deposit rates of
different maturities. This seems to be currently the case in Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. An
implication is that financial liberalisation could be ineffective to increase savings in the presence of
excess bank liquidity (Nissanke, 1991a:143).
(iii) Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was initiated at the end of  1990
with a relaxation of price controls and the scrapping of the foreign exchange allocation mechanism
and import control. An  aim of the ESAP is to shift resources into export production by making
that sector profitable. An increase in exports requires higher working capital for firms, since there
are post-and pre-shipment lags involved between production and receipt of payment. Firms obtain
the majority of their working capital by borrowing from banks. However, banks need to assess the
risks involved, and when this is perceived as too high, they will ration credit. Also, adverse
selection and moral hazard problems, as discussed in the previous section, apply (i) when firms
expand into into new markets there is an inherent uncertainty involved and (ii) banks have difficulty
in screening applications for credit, and in distinguishing between good and bad borrowers.  Before
the current liberalised exchange rate system, Zimbabwean banks did not need an own screening
procedure, since those firms which had a quota of foreign exchange allocated, or possessed an
import licence, in effect signalled that they would be good borrowers, since by implication they had
already been screened. Higher interest rates would not clear the market, since higher interest rates
might lead borrowers to undertake more riskier investment decisions. Furthermore, due to the
liberalisation of the capital account, a re-allocation of portfolios took place in the financial sector,16
away from loans to other assets. The higher incidence of bankruptcy associated with high interest
rates also requires of banks to divert a greater proportion of their loanable funds to the
accumulation of reserves. The consequence of all these factors is to reduce the supply of loanable
funds exactly when export-manufacturing needs to have access to those for working capital
purposes (Adam & Ncube, 1994).
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Figure 3 suggests that after interest rate liberalisation in early 1990, both lending and
deposit rates increased dramatically. It is noticeable from Figure 3 that from mid 1991 to end 1992,
average deposit rates exceeded average lending rates, a phenomenon also described in the case of
The Gambia. Burundi's experience with financial and trade liberalisation seem to be similar in a
number of aspects to that of Zimbabwe. In 1988, interest rate deregulation took place, while
simultaneously, as in The Gambia, an (auction)  market for Treasury Bills was established. Interest
rate deregulation fairly quickly established positive real interest rates. Dercon (1994:2) points to
margins between deposit and lending rates in Burundi rising from 5 Percent in 1988 to 9 percent in
1992, and suspects that this reflects "oligopolistic powers".  He further reports that a RPED survey
of manufacturing firms after these measures were implemented pointed to credit constraints as the
most binding problem for expansion. Interestingly, small firms complained more. This is broadly
similar to problems experienced by firms in Zimbabwe.17
(iv) Nigeria
Nigeria implemented its SAP in July 1986.  Prior to August 1986 interest rates in Nigeria were
generally fixed by the Central Bank of Nigeria with periodic adjustments depending on the
government's sectoral priorities (see Ucendu, 1993). With the implementation of the SAP, which
focused on trade liberalisation in order to stimulate exports and correct price distortions, the need
for financial liberalisation was also realised. The steps that were taken in this regard were interest
rate deregulation, the introduction of an auction market for treasury bills, the identification of
insolvent banks for restructuring, the introduction of more stringent prudential guidelines for banks,
increases in banks' minimum capital requirement, and the upgrading and standardisation of
accounting procedures. Not all of these measures were implemented simultaneously, however.
Interest rate deregulation was the first step. As figure 4 show, interest rates increased significantly
from August 1986.
Figure 4











(Source of data : IMF International Financial Statistics)
Figure 4 shows that average deposit rates exceeded lending rates for a very short period in
1987, after which the levels of interest rates increased significantly, and the gap between lending
and deposit rates widened.  In November 1989, the Nigerian government reversed its initial policy
by re-imposing controls on interest rates.  Maximum spreads between deposit and landing rates (of
7 %) and between prime and highest lending rates (4%) were imposed.
As part of the financial liberalisation, the entry procedure for new banks was eased. This
resulted in a total of 46 new commercial and merchant banks being established between 1986 and
1990, and another 25 being granted licences. Only towards the end of 1990 were a set of prudential
guidelines and accounting standards introduced. By that time some bank insolvencies, due to an
extent to non-performing loans, had occurred. To restore confidence in the banking system the
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) was created in 1988. Early in 1990 the Basle
Accord's risk-weighted capital guidelines were implemented
(v) Kenya
Previous to the implementation of its Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1983, the
financial sector in Kenya suffered from severe repression. Interest rates were maintained below
market-clearing levels, and direct control of credit was the primary monetary control instrument of
the authorities.  Accompanying the SAP, interest rate deregulation took place. In September 1991
the maximum lending rate was increased from 10 to 14 %. The rediscounting rate for crop finance
paper was raised to 11.25 %, while the minimum savings deposit rate was raised to 12.5 %.
Between 1983 and 1987, the differentials between the interest rates of  banks and non-bank19
financial institutions were narrowed. This improved the competitiveness of commercial banks. One
of the first steps towards freeing interest rates was taken in 1989, when the government started
selling Treasury Bonds through an auction. In 1991, interest rates were completely freed.
Figure 5
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Figure 5 shows that interest rates in Kenya have been fairly stable and that  a relatively
constant gap had been maintained between lending and deposit rates for most of the period.
However, it must be borne in mind that, although Kenya was one of the first African countries to
implement a SAP, it was only in 1991 that full interest rate liberalisation took place. Since then,
interest rates have been following a steep upward ascent, with the gap between loan deposit rates
shrinking, very similar to Ghana's initial experience after interest rate liberalisation.
(vi) Generalisations and Empirical Results
Visual inspection of the figures presented in the previous paragraphs suggested that (i) lending rates
initially adjusted more slowly than deposit rates, creating initial periods during which the gap
between lending and deposit rates narrowed, and even became negative in the case of The Gambia
and Zimbabwe and (ii) the level and volatility of interest rates increased after liberalisation.
To evaluate the extent of  (ii) empirically, simple regressions of the change in interest rates
on a constant were estimated and the standard error of the regressions analysed for the period after
liberalisation (which differes from country to country) as well as for two sub-sample periods.20
Interest rates that were used, were short-term (less than 3 months) deposit rates and long-term
deposit rates (longer than 12 months). Monthly data pertaining to the following countries were
used : Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Reliable monthly data for The Gambia could not be
obtained. The results are reported in Tables 1 and 2. For the sake of brevity, only the estimate of
the constant (the average change in the interest rate) as well as the standard error (a measure of
variability) of the equation is reported. Chow-tests for parameter stability (not reported) verified the
choice of subsamples.
Table 1
Variability of Short-term Deposit Rates in Various African Countries

































(Standard errors of the equations are in parentheses)
Table 2
Variability of Long-term Deposit Rates in Various African Countries

































(Standard errors of the equations are in parentheses)
Tables 1 and 2 indicates that the variability of deposit rates had increased in all countries
after financial liberalisation, with the exception of Ghana, where the variability of short-term deposit
rates dampened down somewhat during the later phases of the liberalisation. The largest increases
in the volatility of interest rates occured in Kenya (from 0.279 to 3.21 in case of short-term rates).
Except for Nigeria, short-term deposit rates seems to be more volatile than long-term rates.
As far as the absolute magnitudes of interest rate changes are concerned, Tables  1 and 2
indicates significant increases in Kenya and Nigeria, while the magnitude of changes seems to have
been dampened down in Zimbabwe. Ghana presents a case where changes in deposits rates were
negative  initially, after which they turned positive. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, the changes in short-
term deposit rates are substantially larger than the changes in long-term deposit rates. These are
also the two countries where the yield curve5 (as measured by the spread between short and long-
run deposit rates) is negative during the second sub-sample. This is confirmed by the analysis
summarised in Table 3.  Table 3 shows the average yield gap between long and short rates for the
different countries in Tables 1 and 2. These were calculated by regressing the yield gap on a
constant. The standard errors of these equations show the variability in the yield gap around the
average.
                                               
5  Yield curve theory in the African context is discussed in Naude and Styger (1995).22
Table 3
Variability of Yield Gap in Various African Countries

































(Standard errors of the equations are in parentheses)
Table 3 shows that, without exception, the variance of the  gap between short and long-
term interest rates in African countries had increased after liberalisation, i.e. the slope of the yield
curve had become more variable. In the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe, the yield curve has a
negative slope, most pronounced in Kenya (-11.01). In all countries, except Ghana, the absolute
magnitude of the gap had increased, i.e. the slope of the yield curve had become steeper. Together
with the evidence from Tables 1 and 2, Table 3 suggests that short-term interest rates in Kenya and
Zimbabwe are overshooting their long-run equilibrium level by a significant margin, and that market
expectations are for these rates to eventually converge to a lower rate in the future. In Ghana, the
gap between the two is narrowing, and might reflect only a risk premium still. In Nigeria, the gap
has increased, perhaps suggesting a rise in future short-term interest rates.
To further  assess changes in the yield curves of the countries, the relationship between
long and short rates were estimated. This makes allowance for the way in which the past history of
short-rates might influence the yield curve.
Early work on yield curves, eg. Meiselman (1962), Modigliani and Shiller (1973) and
Modigliani and Sutch (1966) assumed that the pure expectations hypothesis is valid, and posited23
that expectations of future short-term interest rates depend only on the recent path of short-term
rates.  Following more recent work (e.g. Miles, 1989), it can be assumed that the current level of
long-term interest rates depends on past values of both long-rates as well as current and past
changes of short-term interest rates. Thus, equations of the following form were estimated for each
country for the complete sample period as well as for the two sub-samples:
(1)   RL RL RL RS RS t t n t n o t m t m t = + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + - - - a b b g g e 1 1 ... ...
Where RLt = the interest rate on deposits with maturity of longer than 12 months.
           RSt = the interest rate on deposits with a maturity of less than 3 months.
et = a random disturbance term with zero mean and constant variance.
m = n = 4 (which ensured the random disturbance term is white noise).
The following restrictions were tested for each of the four countries and three estimation
periods : b1<1, go= -g1, b2,...bn = 0; g2,..gm =0; a > 0 and 0 < g0 < 1.
If the data will allow these restrictions, the equation has the property that over the short-
term, changes in the short-term rate cause changes in long-term rates, although the long-term rates
move by less than the change in the short-term rate.
The results from an OLS regression for Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe are
summarised in the Appendix. T-ratios are in parentheses, and an asterisk indicates significance at
the 5 % level. The results suggests that not all the restrictions could be accepted for all countries.
For Ghana, only the restriction b1 < 1 could be accepted for the first sub-sample, while the
restrictions that Sbi's and Sgi's =0 could be accepted for all sub-samples. For more recent periods,
changes in short-rates or past levels of long-rates do not seem to have an influence on long-rates at
all.   In the case of Kenya, only changes in contemporaneous short-term interest rates seem to have
any effect on long-term interest rates, but the value of this parameter is smaller than 1 (0.69) and
suggest a less than perfect correspondence between short and long rates. Furthermore, the
acceptance that lags of short-term interest rates are insignificant, suggests that long-run interest
rates do not adjust sluggishly to short-term rates.  For Nigeria, lagged long-term interest rates, as24
well as lagged short-term interest rates influence levels of long-term interest rates, suggesting a
more gradual and sluggish response of long-term interest rates to changes in short-term interest
rates. In Zimbabwe only contemporaneous changes in short-term interest rates and lagged long-
term rates seems to affect current long-term rates. The negative value for b1 indicates that long-term
rates are declining, while the fact that go = 0.4 implies a less than perfect correpondence between
short-term and long-term interest rates.
In sum, the results seems to suggest that in all cases, except Nigeria, financial liberalisation
has resulted in a declining influence of changes in short-rates on long-rates. As far as deposit rates
are concerned, long rates tend to adjust instantaneously to changes in short-term rates, although by
a factor of  less than one. This seem to indicate that the authorities in these countries have achieved
a high level of credibility in curbing inflation (i.e. in bringing government spending under control) -
with the exception of Nigeria (during 1990, the inflation rate averaged around 50 %). If this
conclusion can be accepted, it bodes well for the sustainability of trade liberalisation in these
countries. It should be noted that this conclusion also implies that long-term rates should become
less variable, both absolutely and relatively to short-term interest rates. In this regard the results
obtained in Table 3 corroborate the conclusion, as it indicates that in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe
the absolute and relative  variability of long-term deposit rates did indeed decline. Only in the case
of Nigeria does the evidence suggest that long-term interest rates has become more variable.
The most commonly accepted ways of handling interest rate volatility and the
accompanying risks, are duration analyses and ensuring capital adequacy. The appropriateness of
these for banks in Sub-Saharan Africa will be discussed in the next section.
5. Managing Interest Rate Risk in Africa
African banks avoid the risks inherent in maturity-transformation by reverting to a pure
brokerage function. In developed countries, sophisticated techniques have been created
through which the risk inherent in maturity-transformation can be minimised, such as duration
analysis.  In this regard, a bank's exposure to changes in interest rates is described as its
duration gap. It can be measured either (i) in terms of its impact on the the market value of the
bank or (ii) the net interest income a bank earns over a specified time period, or (iii) the impact
of changes in interest rates on the amount of a bank's capital. Option (i) has led recently to the25
suggestion that banks should adopt market valuations for their assets and liabilities in order to
give investors and depositors an accurate measure of the bank's break-up value. The problem
with this suggestion is that it could cause increased volatility in bank earnings due to the
possibility of cycles in interest rate and economic conditions (Valentine, 1995:3-4). A problem
with (ii) is that it will not generally find the same level of interest rate exposure as would be
indicated by (i) (see Valentine, 1995). The basic shortcoming of (iii) is that should banks use it
to immunise themselves against their interest rate exposure, they will only be immunising
themselves against parallel shifts in the yield curve (Valentine, 1995:5). As was shown in the
previous section, a characteristic of yield curve movements in Africa is that the slope of the
yield curve itself changes, and moreover that the sign of the slope is likely to switch. The
implication is that duration analysis is not the most appropriate mechanism against interest rate
volatility in Africa. Traditionally, the first line of defence against banking risks is bank capital.
Table 4 contains the average percentages of equity capital of total assets of deposit money
banks in the countries under scrutiny, for the period 1970-1993.
Table 4 suggests that, compared to developed countries' banks, African banks hold
much higher ratios of equity capital to total assets;  In the present sample, the average ratio in
1992  was 12.8 percent. This might be explained with reference to the underdeveloped state of
interbank markets in general. However, there is a trend observable in the data not explained by
this : from the late 1970s onward (after the second oil shock and the slowdown in world
economic growth) ratio's started to increase markedly, with those in most countries continuing
to rise following trade liberalisation. This would suggest that banks' perceived the risks in the
general economic environment to have increased. The general tendency for capital:asset ratios
in Africa to exceed those in the developed countries may also be ascribed to this general
perception of heightened risks in the business environment. An exception to the generally
observed pattern of increasing capital:asset ratios is the case of Nigeria. From the analysis in
the previous section, a conclusion is that capital requirements, and perhaps banking
supervision, might not be adequate in Nigeria.26
Table 4
Ratio's of Equity Capital to Total Assets
Year The
Gambia
Ghana Nigeria Kenya Zimbabwe
1970 4.5 6.4 6.4 6.4 n/a
1971 5.5 65.3 8.1 7.0 n/a
1972 6.3 5.5 7.3 7.6 n/a
1973 3.7 5.0 6.5 6.6 n/a
1974 1.5 4.4 4.4 6.9 n/a
1975 3.4 5.4 3.8 7.3 n/a
1976 10.1 3.9 3.3 7.2 n/a
1977 14.0 2.7 3.3 6.9 n/a
1978 14.6 2.4 4.2 7.9 n/a
1979 14.5 2.9 4.1 7.2 n/a
1980 10.7 3.1 3.4 8.7 15.5
1981 10.9 3.4 4.0 9.9 18.0
1982 11.0 4.5 4.3 9.6 16.3
1983 7.1 6.0 4.4 9.9 18.7
1984 7.4 6.3 4.2 11.5 11.4
1985 4.9 7.6 4.5 10.3 10.4
1986 9.5 10 5.2 9.7 11.4
1987 14.3 8.3 4.9 13.8 11.3
1988 12.3 10.9 5.1 14.7 10.7
1989 12.2 n/a 6.9 16.4 10.6
1990 22.4 17.9 7.4 16.9 13.6
1991 19.1 19.8 6.2 16.9 12.7
1992 8.4 17.9 8.0 17.7 12.1
1993 10.5 16.7 n/a 12.9 13.6
  As far as bank capital adequacy in general is concerned, the recent proposals of the
Basle Accord may have a number of implications for bank management in Africa, especially
during trade and financial liberalisations.  Concerning risk management by commercial banks,27
a number of African countries have already subscribes to the Basle Accord (e.g. Zimbabwe,
South Africa, Namibia, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana). Based on his experiences as president of the
Central Bank of Chile, Roberto Zahler recently recommended the Basle Accord's proposals,
stating that
"I believe it would be beneficial for developing countries to ask themselves if their standards of minimum
capital requirements are adequate, using as a basis of comparison the Basle agreement" (Zahler, 1993:52).
The Basle Accord came into being in July 1988 when the central bank governors of the
G-10 countries endorsed a system of risk-based capital guidelines for banking institutions
under their jurisdiction. The primary purposes of the Basle Accord's risk-based capital
guidelines  (Basle Committee, 1993 : 2-5) are to (i) make regulatory capital requirements
sensitive to differences in risk profiles among banking institutions; (ii) take off-balance sheet
exposures explicitly into account in assessing capital adequacy; (iii) minimise disincentives to
hold low-risk liquid assets; (iv) foster co-ordination among supervising authorities from major
industrial countries; (v) reduce international competitive inequities due to differences in capital
policy.
The Accord establised two types of qualifying capital and defines minimum capital for
risk-weighted asset ratios. Tier one capital (or core capital) is pure tangible equity available to
absorb unexpected losses. Tier two (or supplementary) capital consists mainly of reserves.
The risk-based capital guidelines assign each on- and off - balance sheet asset item to
one of four risk categories, namely 0, 20, 50 or 100 percent, depending on the perceived risk
of that item. The currency value of each item is multiplied by its risk weight. The sum of all
these weighted items is the risk-weighted assets. The minimum risk-based capital standard is
equal to 8 percent (Tier one plus Tier two) of the risk-weighted assets.
To the extent that banks cannot meet capital standards, one option would be to have
slower asset growth. The other option would be a rights issue. However, given the thinness
and underdeveloped nature of capital markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is not feasible in most
cases. Therefore, to generate the additional capital internally will imply pressures for higher
operational efficiency and lower dividends. A more medium to long-term solution is for banks
to move more of their assets into less risky assets. In the context of trade liberalisation in Sub-
Saharan African, this may have adverse effects on the trade liberalisation programme, since
export industries may be perceived as more risky.28
Before Basle, many African countries measured capital adequacy with reference to the
ratio of equity to liabilities (deposits), and not equity to assets. This practice is based on the
assumption that liquidity is the fundamental problem facing banks. This is not particularly valid
in the African case since banks in many African countries suffer from excess liquidity and a
danger of insolvency due to the deteriorating quality of loans. The Basle proposals are in this
regard thus, appropriate for African economies. However, the acceptance of Basle Accord will
require a switch in procedure which could leave banks with inadequate levels of current
capital, so that they might have incentives to increase the spread between deposit and loan
rates, and to make less risky loans.
Another shortcoming of the Basle Accord's proposals in the African context, is that
“the internationally agreed system of risk-weighted capital adequacy assessment is already too
complicated for most developing economies to implement effectively" (Fry, 1995a:18).  The
Basle proposals have also been criticised in the African context by Caprio et al (1993:76) who
are of the opinion that the 8% risk-adjusted Basle ratio might not be high enough for countries
whose economies are not well diversified. Polizatto (1991:177) shares this view be stating that
a 8% capital to asset ratio should be seen as the "absolute floor", and that it should be
increased on a case-by-case basis, especially where a bank has substantial off-balance sheet
risks. The conclusion concerning Nigeria from Table 4 supports this view.
Finally, although capital requirements are widely believed to reduce a bank's incentive
to choose riskier assets, Kahane (1977) argued that capital requirements by themselves may be
ineffective in controlling bank risk, and may even induce a bank to choose riskier assets (see
also Koehn & Santomero, 1980). Also, Besanko and Kanatas (1993) show that higher capital
requirements may lead to greater outside equity, which could increase moral hazard because
managers (insiders) have a reduced stake in the bank. This is also suggested by Gennotte and
Pyle (1991). Besanko and Thakor (1992) illustrate that an increase in capital requirements
increases the equilibrium loan size and decreases the equilibrium loan interest rate, but also
decreases the equilibrium deposit rate. In this sense a higher capital requirement acts as a tax
on depositors.
6. Summary and Conclusions
This paper pointed out that financial liberalisation creates a significant interest rate risk, which
might negatively affect the supply of credit by banks. From the Southern Cone's experiences
with financial liberalisation it was concluded that inappropriate bank management resulted in
exceptionally high levels of interest rates as well as diverging spreads between deposit and
loan rates. The main reasons for inappropriate bank management were inadequate supervision29
and regulation. These created moral hazard, adverse selection and principal-agent problems,
and gave rise to high operating, transactions and default costs. A number of common elements
between the experiences of the Southern Cone and African countries were identified, such as
(i) the preference of banks to grant short-term loans, (ii) an increase in banking crises and
financial restructuring accompanying financial liberalisation and the (iii) generally late
recognition by the authorities of existing financial distress.  In contrast to the current situation
facing African countries, the Southern Cone countries faced favourable external circumstances
at the time of their reforms. Bank supervision and bank management therefore takes on a
doubly important dimension in the current African context.  The nature and structure of
banking in Africa should be taken into account when deriving lessons from the Southern Cone.
It was noted that financial systems in Africa are dominated by commercial banks and that
banking firms in Africa are predominantly pure brokerage firms. Liquidity creation, especially
on the  long side of the market might be facilitated if banks became asset-tranforming firms.
This would necessitate that banks become more involved in maturity transformation.
However, when engaged in maturity transformation, banks have to "ride the yield curve" to
make a profit. The risk attached to this is that a sudden change in its slope could adversely
affect profits if liabilities are repriced faster than assets. Under oligopolistic banking structures,
such as found in most African countries, this might cause banks to adjust deposit rates more
sluggishly following financial liberalisation than market forces would dictate. Empirical
evidence showed that this actually occurred in all five countries in the sample : The Gambia,
Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. In Kenya and Zimbabwe average deposit rates actually
exceeded  average loan rates for a period of time. Empirical analysis of a sample of five
African countries also suggested that both the level and the volatility of interest rates increased
following financial liberalisation, and that the spread between deposit and loans rates increased
over time.
Methods to manage interest rate risks were discussed. It was found that duration
analysis might not be appropriate in the African case. Capital adequacy as a defence against
interest rate risk and possible  interest rate mismanagement were discussed and it was pointed
out that the Basle Accord might be relevant for the African case, but that its major
shortcomings were that the acceptance of the Accord's proposals for capital adequacy might
create incentives for banks (i) to increase the spread between loan and deposit rates to earn
more profit, and (ii) to make less risky loans. Both responses imply a reduction in credit
available to firms. Furthermore, an 8% risk-adjusted ratio of capital to assets might not be
enough for a situation in which significant off-balance sheet risks exists. Finally, Basle might
be too complicated to implement effectively in many African countries, although this might be
a short-term problem - experiences of other developing countries with the establishment of30
off-shore banking centra (e.g. Indonesia and Malta) have shown that foreign expertise and
technology can be successfully bought.
Although bank capital requirements might alleviate problems associated with moral
hazard and adverse selection, it still remains predominantly a way for a bank to avoid rather
than manage interest rate risk. The main point is that avoidance of interest rate risk is likely to
lead to a contraction in credit supply. Therefore, banks should be encouraged to engage in
interest rate management, by creating liquidity through maturity. In Asia, separate banking
institutions, in the form of Development Banks, were created to engage specifically in maturity
mismatch mismatch, often through directed credit programmes. The viability of such
institutions in the African context remains to be investigated. Perhaps a first step in the African
context would be the aquisition of new technologies, and the development of appropriate
indicators of interest rate risk. At the same time supervision and regulation need to be
tightened. A necessary condition for the latter is the improvement of bankers' management
skills. Since these solutions are of a long-term nature, the dismal conclusion is that a lack of
credit availibility is likely to remain a factor constraining successful structural adjustment in
Africa.31
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APPENDIX
Regression Results of Relationship between Short and Long Rates in Ghana





























































(5% Critical Value = 1.67)41
Regression Results of Relationship between Short and Long Rates in Kenya
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Regression Results of Relationship between Short and Long Rates in Nigeria
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Regression Results for Relationship between Short and Long Rates in Zimbabwe
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